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Abstract 
This research contribution presents a diagnosis of the health reform experience of 
six small and mid-sized industrial democracies: Chile, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Taiwan and The Netherlands during the last decades of the twentieth century. It addresses 
the following questions: Why have these six countries, facing similar pressures to reform 
their health care systems, with similar options for government action, chosen very 
different pathways to restructure their health care? What did they do? And what 
happened after the implementation of those reforms? The article describes the current 
arrangements for funding, contracting and payment, ownership and administration (or 
“governance”) of health care at the beginning of the 21st century, the origins of the health 
care reforms, the discussion and choice of policy options, processes of implementation 
and “after reform adjustments”. The article looks at factors that help explain the variety 
in reform paths, such as national politics, dominant cultural orientations and the positions 
of major stakeholders. 
 
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This research contribution presents a diagnosis of the health reform experience of 
six small and mid-sized industrial democracies: Chile, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Taiwan and The Netherlands during the last decades of the twentieth century. The 
countries span the globe, hailing from Asia and the Middle East to Latin America and 
Europe. The study is a truly international collaborative undertaking. The authors have all 
lived and worked in one or more of those countries, combining varied academic and 
administrative backgrounds with personal experiences. They brought together a unique 
degree of in-depth knowledge of all six countries that allowed for more detailed findings 
than studies solely based on aggregate data of the OECD or similar international sources.  
This has greatly improved our understanding of similarities and differences between the 
national experiences.   
Recent decades have seen a rapid proliferation of cross-national studies of social 
policy, in particular in the field of health care (Klein 1995). The majority of those studies, 
however, consist of collections of descriptive case studies. They often lack a common 
                                                 
1 This study has its roots in a meeting of the German Bertelsmann Foundation in Helsinki in 2006, attended 
by four of the authors of this article.  Over dinner, they agreed to join forces in an effort to describe and 
analyze the health reform experience of their countries in a separate publication.  The authors are grateful 
to the Bertelsmann foundation for the opportunity to meet and discuss their project.  
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vocabulary and suffer from poorly defined terms (Marmor and Okma 2003). For 
example, the term “health reform” is regularly used but rarely defined in any operational 
way. Another common problem is the assumption that policy as formally stated in policy 
documents or law is the same as policy actually implemented (and adjusted later on). As 
we will show, for a variety of reasons, the ultimate outcome of reform often differs 
greatly from the original policy intentions. This study seeks to contribute to cross-
national policy learning by structured multi-country research. It looks at the health reform 
experience of six quite different countries. In that sense, it represents a “most different 
system design” (Marmor 1988), under a common analytical framework. 
In this contribution, we take “health reform” as major shifts in both decision-
making power over the allocation of resources as well as financial risks in health care 
funding, contracting and ownership2. Shifts in decision-making include, among others, 
the abolishment (or reinstatement) of selective contracting with providers, changes in the 
authority over capital investments, expansion or contraction of entitlements of public 
health insurance, or (new) restrictions on medical decisions imposed by practice 
guidelines and other rules.  Further, decision-making and financial risk can shift from 
national to regional and local governments (or into the other direction), or from 
government control to individual insurers and individual patients and insured.   
Changes in the distribution of the financial risk of medical treatment across the 
system also affect the organization of health care. As an example, the market-oriented 
change in The Netherlands in the early 1990s widened the power of health insurers to 
selectively contract health services. Anticipating this change, providers developed 
strategic alliances and sometimes, regional monopoly positions to safeguard their 
positions (Okma and De Roo, forthcoming). As another example, the Swiss health 
insurance of 1996 shifted decision-making power from the cantons to the federal level, 
but left financial risks for public health expenditure at the canton level. The individual 
mandate to take health insurance increased the role of private health insurers. As the 
insurers still have to contract all health providers, however, the latter did not face much 
financial risks and thus did not change their positions as much as their Dutch 
counterparts.   
This contribution addresses the following questions: Why have these six 
countries, facing similar pressures to reform their health care systems, with similar 
options for government action, chosen very different pathways to restructure their health 
care? What did they do? And what happened after the implementation of those reforms? 
The second section addresses the issues of categorizing countries, health systems 
and health policies. The study combines analytical categories from economic theory with 
concepts from political science in order to better understand the policy experience of the 
six countries of this study. The economic terms describe the basic constituent elements of 
health care: funding, contracting and provision of health services. The terms borrowed 
from political science to analyze the ‘working’ of the system refer to governance models, 
government regulation and underlying social values (or “dominant cultural 
orientations”).3    
The next sections analyze the health reform experience care of Chile, Israel, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan and The Netherlands. Those sections describe the current 
arrangements for funding, contracting and payment, ownership and administration (or 
“governance”) of health care at the beginning of the 21st century. They also address the 
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origins of the health care reforms, the selection of policy options, processes of 
implementation and “after reform adjustments”. The sections look at factors that help 
explain the variety in reform paths, such as national politics and the positions of major 
stakeholders. 
The final section contains general conclusions about comparative methodology 
and empirical findings. The main conclusion is that, indeed--and not surprising for 
scholars of public policy—national values (or dominant cultural orientations), institutions 
and politics all play an important role in the shaping and outcomes of health policy. The 
combination of fiscal and budgetary pressure and ideological change led to reassessments 
of existing arrangements everywhere. Only a few countries systematically studied 
experiences abroad in their search for new policy directions. The cases reveal a 
remarkable variety in reform activity, ranging from the implementation of a uniform 
nation-wide social health insurance (Taiwan) to quasi-privatized schemes in Singapore 
and The Netherlands, regulated private insurance within a regionally decentralized health 
system in Switzerland, to the continuation of the basic sick fund model in Israel with new 
procedures to establish uniform entitlements, and adjustments of the public-private mix 
of health insurance in Chile.    
At first sight, the cases we have selected do not have much in common. The 
countries are located in different continents and show great variety in size, population 
numbers, ethnicity and historical backgrounds (the tables in the appendix present data on 
size, populations, income levels, economic growth and health care of the six countries).  
The countries also differ in “dominant cultural orientations” (see below) and economic 
circumstances, with very different traditions and styles of social policy-making.   
However, they also have some common features. They all are small to mid-size 
industrialized democracies with open economies4. They share the general policy goal of 
providing universal access to good quality health care, and all six have sought to broaden 
insurance coverage while restraining public expenditure. Over time, they have faced 
similar fiscal strains, growing (and changing) demand for medical services and health 
insurance and changing views of the role of the state in society. Moreover, all have 
discussed a similar range of reform options, and all have sought to enlarge access to 
health care services by expanding (public and private) health insurance and tax-based 
funding. Another common feature that sets the group apart is that –illustrating the need to 
make a careful distinction between policy as intention or plans and policy as actually 
implemented change-- all six countries actually undertook major reforms (as defined 
above) in the last two decades, rather than just discussing reform intentions. Public 
discontent, political willingness to act and the availability of policy options combined to 
create “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon 1984) for such change. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the countries selected are “under the radar screen”: they are usually not 
included in international comparative studies.   
The seemingly common experience in reform goals and means can easily lead to 
generalized conclusions of (global) convergence. However, the health politics of the six 
countries of this study have not converged into one common direction. Each country has 
implemented change within the restraints of existing national institutions and political 
boundaries. While the goals and range of options considered were strikingly similar, the 
six countries diverged widely in the actual reform models and process of implementation. 
Ideas, interests and political institutions played important roles. The differences reflect 
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country-specific cultural values (for example solidarity versus individual consumer 
choice), ideological views of the role of state and citizens, institutions (for example 
centralized versus decentralized political power) and interests (stakeholders that 
encourage, thwart or slow down reforms).   
The timing and speed of change varied as well.  In some countries, governments 
were able to rapidly implement major change. Others, facing strong opposition by 
organized stakeholders, had to adjust or even abandon their reform efforts. In several 
cases, the introduction of market competition went hand-in-hand with increased 
government control, leading to increased “hybridization” of health care systems. The 
current reality of growing diversity and hybridization (or perhaps, rather, 
“complexification”) of health care arrangements illustrate that systems do not fit easily 
within common categorizations. 
At the level of specific programs and policies rather than at the national country 
level, however, we see more similarity in experience. For example, in several cases the 
efforts to change payment modes and methods for medical care took more time than 
originally envisioned. In most if not all countries, governments softened the effects of 
market competition by imposing restrictions on both health insurers and providers of care 
(for example, by mandating entitlements of private health insurance, forcing private 
insurance to accept everyone seeking insurance, imposing national fees and tariffs and 
quality norms for both publicly and privately funded health care and providing subsidy 
for low-income groups). In all cases, faced with popular opposition, governments 
moderated the effects of patient co-payments by exempting certain groups. 
The conclusions confirm the need to collaborate across countries and disciplines.  
No individual researcher can do a systematic study of change and non-change in, say, 
more than three or four countries at this depth of understanding and detail. Second, the 
study confirms the need to pay more attention to small and medium countries. The vast 
majority of comparative research in the field focuses on the big countries, with the US, 
Canada, the UK, and sometimes France, Germany and Australia as the usual suspects.  
There is little research focusing on the experience of smaller and mid-sized countries 
while, in fact, the vast majority of the world’s nations fall under those categories. To fill 
this gap, many more studies are needed. This research aims to take a step into that 
direction.  Small nations, unite--in our comparative research!! 
 
 
2.  Categorizing countries and health care systems  
 
According to reports of Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) it is possible to describe any given health care system in terms of a country-
specific mix of public and private funding, contracting and modes of providing medical 
services (OECD 1992, OECD 1994). There are five main sources of funding and three 
dominant contracting models. In industrial countries, the major funding sources are 
general taxation (general revenue, earmarked taxes and tax expenditure), public and 
private insurance, direct patient payments (co-payments, coinsurance, deductibles and 
uninsured services) and voluntary contributions. There are three basic contracting 
models. The first is the “integrated model”, with funding and ownership of services under 
the same (public or private) responsibility. The best-known example of this model is the 
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original British National Health Service (NHS). Examples of integrated private model are 
some of the “Health Maintenance Organizations” (HMOs) in the US—that, in fact, 
closely resemble the 19th century German sickness funds that owned clinics and 
employed physicians. The second model is the “contracting model”, where governments 
or other third payers negotiate long-term contracts with health care providers. The third 
model, common in private insurance, is that of reimbursement where the patient first pays 
his provider and then seeks reimbursement from his insurance agency.   
At the provision side, the ownership and management of health services can be 
public, private (both for profit and not for profit), or--common in most countries--a mix 
of those. Moreover, there are country-specific mixes of formal and informal care, 
traditional and modern medicine, and medical and related social services. In this 
contribution, the emphasis is on medical care, but borderlines with other services are not 
always clear, and national health policies express divergent cultural views about such 
borderlines.   
The combination of those three core elements: funding, contracting (including the 
payment modes) and ownership largely determines the allocation of financial risks and 
decision-making power over the main players in health care. For example, tax funding 
and government ownership make for strong government influence whereas private 
funding (insurance and direct patient payments) combined with legally independent 
providers restricts the role of the state (as in Switzerland or The Netherlands), even while 
governments often can—and do--impose rules to protect patients or safeguard the quality 
of health care.  
OECD countries have developed a variety of health governance models (Okma, 
2002). Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) identify three “dominant cultural orientations” in 
welfare states: “competitive individualism”, “hierarchical collectivism” and 
“sectarianism”. The majority of the social democratic states of North Western Europe 
base their fiscal and social policy on principles of solidarity and equality. They have 
strong collectivist traditions, with modest individualism and weak sectarianism. They 
also have strong bureaucratic traditions. In some countries, in particular Germany and 
The Netherlands, those bureaucracies engage in semi-permanent consultation with the 
organized stakeholders in the “neocorporatist” style of governance (even while in The 
Netherlands that practice has declined in the last two decades). The United States, in 
contrast, is a more liberal welfare state, with weak collectivism and an outspoken streak 
of sectarianism. Market competition and individual liberty are guiding principles in much 
of its social policy. Another categorization of social policy takes the underlying welfare 
principles as starting point, distinguishing income protection, behaviorist, residualist and 
populist redistributive principles to characterize social policy (Marmor, Mashaw and 
Harvey 1990). Those general orientations and principles translate in certain styles of 
policy-making in health care (Okma 2002).   
It would be an error, however, to take such general orientations as representations 
of particular countries. Models do not cover countries on a one-to-one basis.  Different 
styles of governance can exist side by side, and over time, there may be shifts from one 
style to another. For example, Dutch health policies shifted from a solidarity-based model 
towards elements of market competition, with a rise of behaviorist principles and a more 
residualist role of the state in unemployment and disability policies. Taiwan, as we will 
show, went into opposite direction by transforming its existing health insurance schemes 
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into a population-wide national insurance. The Swiss, Israel and Dutch health policy 
arenas all reveal features of neocorporatist policy-making where governments share the 
responsibility over social policy with organized interests. Of the six countries of this 
study, Singapore appears least bounded by ideology or labels, preferring a pragmatic 
approach. In fact, as we will see, the above typologies of welfare state arrangements 
serve more to characterize certain categories of policies than entire countries or health 
care systems.  
 
 
3. Health care reform in Chile   
 
Chile is a mid sized industrial country in southeastern Latin America located between 
Argentina and the Pacific Ocean, with a population of about sixteen million in 2004. 
Over ninety percent live in urban areas. Chile has long been one of the leaders in social 
policy change in Latin America, sometimes called the “regional benchmark for structural 
reforms” (OECD 2003). In 1924, Chile was one of the first countries in Latin America 
with public pensions and health insurance (De Viado and Flores 1944). Three factors 
combined to open a “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 1984) for introducing social 
insurance at that time, not only in Chile, but also in other countries in Latin America. 
First, European countries, in particular Germany, provided the model of employment-
based social insurance to protect family incomes of industrial workers in case of 
disability, illness and old age. Second, there was growing awareness of the need for 
government actions to address the poor health of the working population, poverty and 
labor unrest after the Second World War. Third, there was political willingness to act.   
The social health insurance of 1924 only covered urban manual workers. It 
explicitly excluded rural and domestic workers and self-employed. There were separate 
schemes for employees and civil servants. The entitlements included sickness and 
medical benefits, maternity benefits, health services for infants up to two years old, and 
benefits in case of invalidity, old age and death. In 1942, the above schemes for white-
collar workers merged into the Servicio Médico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA). 
SEMENA was based on individual capitalization funds and preferred provider 
arrangements with independent providers (Labra, 1995). In 1952 Chile began to 
implement the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS), resembling the British National Health 
Service.  Public health was seen as a universal citizen’s right. Both membership and 
range of entitlements of the social health insurance gradually expanded.  “Indigents” who 
could not prove their income received a “certificate of poverty” that provided access to 
the SNS.   
In September 1973, the Pinochet military regime overthrew socialist president 
Allende who had been elected three years before. Heavily influenced by the neoliberal 
ideology of the University of Chicago School of Economics, the regime favored a 
reduced role of the state and a shift towards privatization and consumer choice as driving 
forces in healthcare (Jost 1999). It drastically reduced social spending and public health 
services.  
Since the early 1980s, insured under the public scheme FONASA can opt out and 
seek coverage from the private insurance Institución de Salud Previsional (ISAPRE). The 
expectation was that the exodus from the social insurance would strengthen the private 
 6
insurance and reduce the public sector to a minimum. In fact, predictably--and similar to 
the experience of other countries--, the “opting out option” led to a spiraling process of 
risk selection as the young and healthy went private, but the sick and elderly had to 
remain in (or return to) the public scheme as they faced serious access barriers in the 
private market.  
The return to democracy in March 1990 brought social policy based on a mix of 
market orientation, social solidarity and strong public responsibility. The new 
government announced massive additional investment to improve the quality of public 
services and reduce waiting times. It did not do away with the dual health insurance 
system, however, but imposed extensive regulation on health providers and insurers. The 
share of private insured has since dropped from twenty-five percent in 1996 (Jost 1999) 
to twenty-three percent in 1999 (Sapelli 2004) and 16.3 percent of the population in 2006 
(FONASA 2007).  In 2006, almost 60 per cent of the population had coverage under the 
public scheme (FONASA 2007). General taxation provided 49.9 per cent of health 
funding, public health insurance 42 per cent, patient co-payments 6.6 per cent and other 
sources 2.5 per cent (FONASA, 2007). Patients under the public scheme face modest 
amounts of co-payments, but over 60 per cent of the population is exempt from paying 
those fees.     
The private ISAPRE schemes mostly function as traditional for profit insurers. 
They offer coverage for health care and pay for sick leave. Since 2005, they face 
extensive government regulation: a certain minimum coverage, uniform premium 
structure, and community-rated premiums. ISAPREs do not have to accept all applicants, 
but they must cover both insured and dependents. Families cannot split their coverage 
between the public and private insurance –if one spouse is in, the whole family must be 
under the same scheme. Most ISAPREs charge user fees, with co-payments between 30 
and 50 per cent, subject to caps to mitigate the financial burden for lower income 
families. Some of the private insurers own health facilities, or have preferred provider 
arrangements with health care providers (Jost, 1999). The largest one, CONSALUD, 
owns clinics and hospitals and is able to steer its insured towards those facilities.  
Another large one, Banmedica, has formed an integrated financing and delivery model 
with a large hospital in Santiago. It requires its members to choose a gatekeeper primary 
care physician (an internist or pediatrician) from a closed panel list.   
Chile has a long tradition with free choice of provider (the SNS introduced free 
choice to its white collar workers in 1968), and insurers are hesitant to impose too many 
restrictions on their insured (or face the wrath of the medical association). The 
introduction of “integrated forms of managed care” has been a slow process (Jost 1999).  
In total, the system offers fairly broad access to public health services (including primary 
care, immunization and other preventive services, elderly care and mother and child 
care). For other health care services, however, there are two separate systems: the public 
one (for the FONASA insured) and the private one (for the ISAPRE insured). The latter 
tend to be concentrated in wealthy urban areas, especially in Santiago (FONASA 2007). 
There are separate services for the police and armed forces. The variety of public and 
private schemes has led to fragmentation. As in other countries, the dual insurance 
system with voluntary enlisting faces rising problems of risk selection and moral hazard 
(Sapelli 2006; Höfter 2006). The public system is plagued by a lack of funding and 
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shortages of qualified personnel. There are frequent strikes by health professionals 
dissatisfied with low pay and poor working conditions.   
The majority of hospitals as well as local clinics and municipal primary care 
centers are public. A small number of private for profit clinics mainly serves the urban 
elite. Long-term contracts between FONASA and hospitals provide the base for paying 
inpatient care. Hospitals receive prospective budgets (over sixty percent is historically 
based) plus additional payments for specific activities. Private insurers provide about 
fifteen percent of the hospital income; they negotiate contracts and fees with (preferred) 
providers.  
In the late 1990s, the government announced a shift towards capitation payment 
of primary care and case-based payments (or DRG-based payments) for hospital care 
(Jost, 1999). But this turned out a complex process. In the mid-2000s, case-based 
payment contributed only about ten percent of hospital budgets. Facing much opposition 
to market-oriented change, the government reaffirmed its strong commitment to 
maintaining a public health system as a viable alternative to the private sector.  
The Chilean experience illustrates that a change in political regime can create a 
“window of opportunity” for change. But dominant values as well as long-standing 
institutions restrain what government can in fact implement. Even while the military 
regime shifted towards private health insurance, it did not do away with all public health 
services. Likewise, the restoration of democracy in 1991 did not do away with private 
health insurance. There have been efforts to regulate the private insurance, but private 
insured still face problems of risk selection and exclusion of pre-existing conditions from 
coverage.     
 
 
4.   Health care reform in Israel  
 
Israel, a small country at the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean bordered by Lebanon, 
Jordan and Egypt with about six million habitants, is another country with a long 
tradition of public health insurance. In 1911, labor unions established the first mutual sick 
fund, followed by three other funds in the 1920s and 1930s (Rosen 2003). The health 
insurance started as an employment-based scheme modeled after the employment-based 
(Bismarckian) social health insurance of Germany, but gradually expanded to cover all 
but the entire population. In the late 1980s, 95% of the population had voluntarily 
enrolled with one of the four (not for profit) funds. Despite this nearly universal 
coverage, the system was plagued by financial instability, public and provider 
dissatisfaction, hospital overcapacity and fragmentation of services. Finally--at least in 
the eyes of Israeli public and politicians--there were too many uninsured (as in The 
Netherlands, even a small share of uninsured can cause political pressure on government 
to take action, see below).   
In 1995 Israel enacted the National Health Insurance Law (NHI) that mandates all 
residents to register with a sick fund.  By extending the social insurance from employed 
persons to the entire population, it created a hybrids between the Bismarckian model and 
the National Health Insurance. The NHI is a population-wide social health insurance, 
administered by four major (competing) sick funds. The NHI was part of a three pronged 
reform proposed by the 1990 Netanyahu Commission, a state commission of inquiry. 
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Two other planks of the reform --changing government hospitals to public trusts and the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Health –never materialized because of too much 
resistance of hospital labor unions. From a rational planning point of view, the partiality 
of the reform is a recipe for frustration. Nonetheless, from a policy-learning point of view 
(Helderman et al 2005), NHI’s enactment set in motion a chain of events worth looking 
at. The NHI led to one radical change that in itself did not depend on the full 
implementation of the envisioned reform: a legally defined universal standard basket of 
services. Previously, each fund could determine its own entitlements, and was not 
required to provide any particular service. While other countries like the Netherlands 
(Berg and Van der Grinten 2004) and New Zealand (Chinitz 1999) abandoned the idea of 
(explicitly) defining a core basket of health services, Israel went quite clearly, if not 
always resolutely, down this road. 
The major funding sources for health care in Israel are social insurance 
contributions, tax subsidy and modest amounts of patient co-payments. In recent years, 
co-payments for hospital stay and prescription drugs have gone up, but there are many 
exemptions and caps on the total amount that families pay each year, with lower caps for 
elderly. As the mandatory social health insurance offers a wide range of entitlements, 
supplemental health insurance plays an insignificant (but growing) role. This covers the 
costs of private physicians, treatment in private clinics and complementary medicine.   
Israelis can choose the fund they want to register with, and can change two times 
per year.  In 1995, the first year they had this option, about 4 per cent of the population 
actually switched, but after that, the rate of change went down to about one per cent. The 
largest fund, Chalit, covers 60 per cent of the population, the other three about 36 per 
cent. The NHI explicitly lists its entitlements in an appendix. It not only specifies 
procedures and pharmaceuticals, but also provides guidelines for applications. If a 
physician prescribes an "off indication" or "outside of the guideline" use of a particular 
drug, the sick fund is within its legal rights to refuse to reimburse5. Parliament can add 
(or de-list) entitlements within the available public budget to cover the anticipated costs 
(the Ministry of Finance agreed to expand the annual budget by about 1% for this 
expansion). In 1998 the government set up a Public Committee to assess the addition of 
new services (Chinitz et al 1998). The Committee meets several times a year and media 
regularly cover its activities. It ranks potential new services, based on health technology 
assessment by the Ministry of Health (MoH). In a typical neo-corporatist mode, the 
Committee is made up of twenty-four physicians, experts of the MoH and sick funds, and 
public representatives. It bases its deliberation on ethical, economic and social criteria in 
order to decide which services will be included. Not surprisingly, the list of services 
seeking entrance into the basket, mainly pharmaceuticals, usually exceeds the available 
funding, and there is much pressure from patients and lobby groups. 
Insured can seek supplementary insurance offered both by sick funds and private 
health insurance (one quarter of the population chose the latter). In the early 2000s, some 
funds expanded their supplemental coverage with drugs and some other services not 
covered under the basic insurance. Ironically, the Ministry of Finance opposed this move, 
as it would increase national health expenditure and create a two-tiered system. 
Health care providers include hospitals owned by government and sick funds, 
clinics owned by sick funds, self-employed physicians who have contracts with funds, 
and private for profit hospitals, laboratories and institutes. Mother-and-child care, mental 
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health care and nursing care are not included in the NHI and are subject to different 
arrangements. All insured can select a primary care physician who works in a nearby 
clinic of their health fund, or a self-employed physician with a contract with their fund. 
Access to non-emergency care generally requires a referral from the health fund 
physician or pre-approved from the fund. While Israelis can, and do, exercise choice of 
hospital, referrals generally include direction to a specific provider. Hospitals receive 
capped budgets, though the funds typically reimburse 50 per cent of budget overruns.  
Emergency care and outpatient clinics are paid on a fee for service base. Physicians in 
hospitals usually receive salaries, while independent general practitioners receive 
capitation payment for each individual on their patient list. Independent physicians 
receive a capitation payment for those patients making a visit. The capitation payments 
are generally a form of capped fee for service, and do not involve risk bearing on the part 
of the physician. The MoH sets the per diem rates and fee schedules for the entire 
country. 
National professional associations of hospital physicians, nurses and other 
providers negotiate salaries on behalf of their members. In Jerusalem, physicians are 
permitted private work in hospital under strict regulation. Elsewhere, ad hoc 
arrangements allowed physicians to do private work in hospital, but these were halted by 
order of the State Attorney General and the issue has not been resolved. Many physicians 
based in public hospitals have after-hours private practices and perform procedures at 
private hospitals. 
The sick funds are legally independent entities, but the MoH has overall 
responsibilities. It sets the rules, defines benefits, is involved in planning and allocation 
of budgets, sets hospital budgets and imposes limits on public spending as well as 
numbers of physicians. The National Health Insurance Institute administers the funding 
of the NHI. It collects contributions via the tax system and allocates those over the funds.  
The collective bargaining and active participation of the main organized stakeholders 
resembles the neocorporatist style of social policy-making of Western Europe. In general, 
this gives providers of care a strong veto position.   
Private insurers can set their own premiums, and membership is subject to 
underwriting. The National Health Insurance Regulator, a branch of the Ministry of 
Finance, regulates private health insurance. Recently, the Insurance Regulator intervened 
and overturned the refusal of private insurers to pay for pharmaceuticals for which a 
substitute existed in the national standard basket of services. Traditionally the MoH has 
monitored both the basic insurance and supplemental coverage. The ministry has the 
reputation of an ineffective regulator. It owns two thirds of general hospital beds. This 
has created a conflict of interest and sometimes inability to turn its attention from the 
day-to-day management of hospitals towards planning and regulation. In recent years, the 
MoH has turned out to be a better at financial regulation than at quality assurance.  
Through control over hospital reimbursement rates, it has been able to stabilize hospital 
expenditure. As of 2006, the health funds were, by and large, working within balanced 
budgets for the standard basket of services. The Ministry has been less adept at regulating 
quality of care. Lacking resources, and confronting less than complete cooperation from 
physicians' associations, it has not been able to create a framework for ongoing quality 
assurance in provision and insurance. Physicians' associations and health funds 
participate in benchmarking and other quality assurance efforts, but they do not agree on 
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public disclosure of measured results. The MoH is a frequent target of critical media 
coverage of medical error and malfeasance, and has set up investigative and disciplinary 
committees to deal with these concerns.  
Israeli health policy-making thus provides an interesting example of a 
combination of strong government involvement on one hand and political timidity to 
enact radical change. The strong veto position of organized interests evidently contributes 
to the government’s incapacity to implement change rapidly. The Israeli experience 
illustrates as well another possible interpretation: namely, that partially implemented 
reforms may offer a more realistic and interesting comparative experience than "perfect" 
policy reform that is not implemented. 
 
 
 
4. Health care reform in Singapore 
 
Singapore is a tiny island city-state with a population of 4.5 million, one of the densest 
populated countries in the world.  It is a parliamentary democracy that gained self-rule 
from the British in 1959, and independence from Malaysia in 1965. The ruling People’s 
Action Party has been in power since 1959 – hence, it has the rare advantage of being 
able to pursue its reform agenda without much opposition or undue interruption. In 2005, 
Singapore spent about S$7.6 billion or 3.8 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) 
on health care. Of this, government expended only about S$1.8 billion or 0.9 per cent of 
GDP. The main funding sources for health care are employer benefits (35%), government 
subsidies (25%) and out-of-pocket payment (25%). In addition, there are three schemes to 
help families pay their medical bills: Medisave, Medishield, Medifund.  Medisave 
accounts for 8 per cent of total health care expenditure, while Medishield and Medifund 
together account for about 2 per cent.  Private insurance covers about 5 per cent of all 
costs. 
The Singaporean health care reforms trace back to 1960. Barely six months into 
office, the newly elected government introduced for the first time user fees. It charged 50 
cents (1 US dollar = 1.48 Singapore dollars in 2007) per visit to a government outpatient 
clinic. Further, it decentralized primary care from the overcrowded General Hospital 
(which registered 2400 out-patients a day) to a network of 26 satellite outpatient 
dispensaries and 46 maternal and child health clinics - a process that would take four 
years to complete. These steps were, in hindsight, a harbinger of things to come.  
Before 1960, health care was mainly funded from government revenues, but 
standards in the decrepit and poorly equipped hospitals were not high. Less than 50 
doctors were in possession of higher qualifications. The Minister of Health declared in 
1967 that “health would rank, at most, fifth in order of priority” for funds—after national 
security, job creation, housing and education, in that order (Yong, 1967).  It was not until 
the 1970s that medical specialization began in earnest, and not until the 1980s that the 
government responded to the rising aspirations that accompanied growing affluence. In 
1983, it unveiled a National Health Plan that included an ambitious hospital construction 
and expansion program to replace the old buildings inherited from the British colonial 
times, and an innovative health funding model to propel Singapore medicine into the 
modern, high-tech era. The philosophy behind the reform—that nothing comes free--was 
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very unorthodox for a government elected on a democratic socialism platform. The 
emphasis was on individual responsibility, with the state as payer of last resort. 
In the early 1960s, the political leadership had taken an abrupt right turn 
ideologically (leading to its eventual withdrawal or perhaps expulsion from the Socialist 
International in 1976). It trumped the political left (from which it had openly split) in the 
battle for the hearts and minds of the hard-working Singaporeans. Since then Singapore 
has eschewed, at least rhetorically, egalitarian welfarism in favor of market mechanisms 
to allocate finite resources. In practice, this meant using pricing to curb demand but at the 
same time, softening the consequences to protect lower income groups. Pragmatism, not 
ideology, would guide social policies in the decades that followed.  Government and 
people focused single-mindedly on expanding the size of the economic pie. The 
government encouraged citizens to assume personal responsibility for their own welfare, 
while it pledged to continue subsidizing vital areas like housing, health and education to 
make them affordable for all.   
Singapore introduced Medisave in 1984 as an extension of the existing national 
superannuation scheme, the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The CPF is a compulsory, 
tax-exempt, interest-yielding pension savings scheme. It started in 1995 (it was already 
implemented elsewhere in Britain’s colonies including British Malaysia and some 
African countries to ensure that the social security needs of would not drain the British 
public funds). Medisave represents 6-8 per cent of wages (depending on age) sequestered 
from the individual’s CPF account. The account holders can use Medisave to pay for 
hospitalization and acute medical care (including hospice care, certain expensive 
outpatient treatments like day-surgery, radiotherapy, chemotherapy, renal dialysis, in 
vitro fertilization and hepatitis B vaccination). Account holders can also use the fund to 
pay for hospitalization of their spouses, children, siblings or parents and any unspent 
balance passes on to their beneficiaries after their death (Lim 2004a). 
Medishield, the voluntary, low cost catastrophic illness insurance scheme 
complements Medisave. Medisave funds can be used to pay for the Medishield 
premiums. The third “M”—Medifund—is the state-funded safety net that takes care of 
those without the means to pay, including people not covered by Medisave or 
Medishield, or those who have run out of their quota in these schemes. Medifund was set 
up as an endowment fund. Its interest is distributed to the public hospitals to cover costs 
of patients genuinely unable to pay their hospital bills. The government periodically tops 
up (from budget surpluses) the various schemes in such way as to preferentially benefit 
low-income families and the elderly. In addition, in 2000, it set up an “Eldercare Fund” to 
provide subsidies to voluntary welfare organizations that offer care to the elderly. This 
fund is expected to reach 2.5 billion Singapore dollars by 2010. Eldercare was followed 
in 2002 by Eldershield, an insurance scheme for severely disabled elderly Singaporeans, 
with premiums payable out of their Medisave accounts. The combined Medisave 
accounts of all Singaporeans now amount to S$36 billion (or 24.3 billion US dollars). 
That is a not insignificant sum considering that the annual total healthcare expenditure in 
Singapore is almost seven billion Singapore dollars. A further redistributional element is 
embedded in the graded hospital wards, ranging from single rooms to open dormitories 
with eight or more beds. Patients in class A beds pay full costs, while those in Class C 
enjoy 80 per cent subsidy. The MoH estimates that more than 96 per cent of B and almost 
98 per cent of C patients should be able to fully pay for their bills from their Medisave 
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account. Access to necessary medical care for the poor is guaranteed by a government 
promise that “no Singaporean will ever be denied needed health care because of inability 
to pay” (Lim 1998).  
Singapore’s hospital restructuring process started in 1985 and took 20 years to roll 
out. The backdrop of this was the economic recession of the mid-1980s when the 
government sought to transfer the engine of economic growth from the public to the 
private sector. A 1986 Report of the Economic Committee mentioned healthcare as a 
prime candidate for deregulation and privatization. The government considered various 
models to reduce or eliminate control by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and to grant 
hospitals autonomy, ranging from a statutory board to manage public hospitals to 
wholesale privatization to increase efficiency. At first, the government chose the latter. 
Widespread public unhappiness over the planned privatization, however, led to months of 
intense debate in public forums, media, and parliament. In a rare instance of retreat in the 
face of negative public opinion, government modified its original privatization plan. It 
opted instead for “corporatization” of the public hospitals and specialty centers (Phua 
1991, Preker and Harding 2003). Thus, one by one, these institutions gained autonomy in 
fiduciary and operational matters as independent entities within the meaning of 
Singapore’s Companies Act. The government created a monolithic government company, 
the Health Corporation of Singapore (HCS) Private Limited in 1987 to own and manage 
all corporatized hospitals and specialty centers. The independent hospitals, although 
“private” in name, each under its own board of directors, were actually public since they 
were owned 100 per cent by the HCS, which in turn was 100 per cent government-
owned. By the year 2000, every public hospital and specialist medical center had become 
corporatized. Hospitals were free to set their own directions and to compete with each 
other. As market mechanisms and structures replaced old bureaucratic ones, efficiency 
and service levels indeed improved. As each hospital increasingly focused on its own 
survival and bottom line, however, competition became counter-productive. 
Dysfunctional aspects surfaced such as the poaching of staff from other hospitals by 
offering higher salaries. Non-cooperation between institutions resulted in missed 
opportunities for exploiting economies of scale such as central drug purchasing or 
developing a common information technology (IT) platform for electronic medical 
records. Each hospital CEO vied to increase its market share through high-tech 
acquisitions and other means, confident that HCS or the MOH would eventually bail 
them out if they ran deficits. Hospital expenditures rose sharply, contributing to health 
care cost inflation. 
The government intervened in 2000. Believing the competition would work better 
with a smaller number of competitors, it arbitrarily regrouped the corporatized 
institutions into two competing “clusters” - the National Healthcare Group and the 
Singapore Health Services. These quasi-independent clusters would still report to the 
MOH as the Ministry appointed its boards. Simultaneously, the two clusters took control 
over all the government polyclinics for primary care. Thus in one fell swoop, government 
achieved horizontal and vertical integration of all public sector health care providers at 
the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Shortly after, it introduced DRG-based 
payments, followed by global budgeting, both aimed at curbing supply-side moral hazard. 
The reforms resulted in raised standards of care and levels of service that are a far 
cry from the overcrowded wards and unresponsive outpatient clinics of yesteryear. 
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Average waiting time for elective surgery nowadays is a mere two weeks while a recent 
survey showed overall patient satisfaction at 80 per cent (Lim 2004b). Mandatory 
hospital quality committees and voluntary Joint Commission International (JCI) 
accreditation ensure clinical quality and patient safety. In fact, one-third of Asia’s 
accredited health care facilities are now found in Singapore (Newsweek 2007). The city-
state’s vibrant biosciences research and development environment also enhances its 
reputation as a center of medical excellence. In 2005, more than 374,000 foreign patients 
sought treatment in Singapore, four out of five in private clinics and hospitals. Growth in 
the number of foreign patients has been averaging 20 per cent in the last few years, 
thanks to the stepped-up efforts by Singapore Medicine, a government-industry 
partnership established in 2003 to turn Singapore into a leading medical hub. 
Patients have complete freedom of choice of providers, which include 29 well-
equipped hospitals and specialty centers with 12,000 beds (or 3.7 beds per 1,000 
population). A thriving private sector accounts for about 21 per cent of inpatient beds and 
80% of outpatient attendance (Ministry of health 2007). The government has signaled it 
would like to see the private share of hospital beds increase to 30 per cent. Four of the 
for-profit chains are currently listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. The government 
actively encourages competition and publishes hospital bill sizes and selected quality 
indicators on its website to encourage consumer choice.  
 The health care system of Singapore thus reflects a mix of strong market 
orientation and individualism, with a high acceptance of government intervention. The 
absence of a tradition of well-organized stakeholders and opposition groups has 
contributed to the rapid adoption of top-down policies. The combination of individual 
savings accounts with employer subsidies and public (means-tested) subsidy targeted at 
low-income families make for a quasi-private system under tight government control. 
Another unique feature of Singapore is its extraordinary high savings rate that combined 
with high economic growth rates (averaging eight percent per annum over the last twenty 
years) makes for a comfortable starting point of public policy. Patients are accustomed to 
cost sharing rather than depend on state largesse. The cost-sharing formula has to some 
extent countered the “moral hazard” generally associated with fee-for-service, third party 
reimbursement. Singapore has deliberately avoided the more costly “leveling down” 
option of universal access regardless of ability to pay, in which the “undeserving rich” 
enjoy the same benefits as the poor. Compared to OECD countries, Singapore has been 
very successful in containing the level of health care spending to below 5 per cent of 
GDP (see table 2). It remains to be seen, however, whether it will be able to maintain that 
low spending level. As Singapore’s economy matures, economic growth will inevitably 
slow down, lessening the masking effect of the expanding GDP denominator.  Moreover, 
Singapore has a very young population. The elderly now constitute only 8 per cent of the 
population, but are projected to increase to twenty-five percent in 2030. Hence, rising 
healthcare expenditure is likely to create sharper trade-offs between efficiency, quality 
and equity and may also accentuate disparities between the different socioeconomic 
classes (Lim 2005).  
Paradoxically, just when governments elsewhere are mulling over cutbacks in 
health spending, Singapore’s health care planners are busy laying out the groundwork for 
the expansion and upgrading of its health facilities over the next 10 years, costing billions 
of dollars. There are two reasons for this. First, in order to safeguard generate human 
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capital needed to sustain Singapore’s dynamic economy, the population needs to grow by 
another two million (largely through immigration), stabilizing at 6.5 million persons. 
Second, Singapore Medicine is targeting 1 million foreign patients by 2012 and it reckons 
this will generate three billion Singapore dollars in revenues and create 13,000 new jobs 
(Choo 2002). Hence demand for quality health care services, on both domestic and 
foreign fronts, cannot but rise. For the pragmatic government with a knack for turning 
necessity into virtue, that is not necessarily a bad thing.  
 
 
5. Health care reform in Switzerland: from social insurance to federalist 
arrangements 
 
 
Switzerland is a small landlocked country in Central Europe between Germany, Austria, 
Italy and France (it shares three of its four formal languages with its neighboring 
countries). It is a federal state composed of twenty-six smaller states (cantons), with a 
population of 7.2 million. Three particular characteristics of the political and institutional 
context provide a high degree of voice, choice and exit opportunities (Hirschman 1970) 
to Swiss citizens: a decentralized political system with institutions of direct democracy, a 
long tradition of social security and a liberal economic culture. Swiss health care has its 
historical base on the two institutional pillars of direct democracy and federalism.6 Swiss 
citizens can intervene directly in the political decisional process by referendum to  
approve or reject reform proposals. Historically, this has slowed down major change. 
Federalism, expressed in the autonomy of the cantons, allows for distinct regional 
models. Combined, those two factors have resulted in large regional variations and 
seemingly insurmountable barriers to nation-wide (and pro-poor) reform (Crivelli et al. 
2007).   
 
Health Insurance 
 
Having been given the mandate to legislate on sickness and accident insurance in 
1890, the federal government passed the first Swiss health insurance law in 1911 
(Civitas2002). This law established a statutory package of benefits. In contrast to the 
social insurance in France and Germany, it stated that individuals, not employers are to 
contract insurance. By 1990, nearly 98% of the population had purchased (voluntary) 
insurance.7  The sick funds faced financial difficulties throughout the middle of the 20th 
century.  Moreover, the left-wing parties made several attempts to improve the equity of 
health insurance by making the premiums dependent on income. However, only three of 
the ten reforms proposed by Parliament or civil society between 1974 and 2003 passed 
via popular vote, two of those based on federal decrees and focusing on minor aspects. 
The third proposal accepted via popular vote, however, was a major reform--the 
Revised Health Insurance Law of 1994. It came into effect in January 1996. The three 
main objectives of the reform were to strengthen solidarity, to improve cost control and 
to promote fair competition between health insurers. The law strengthened the role of the 
federal state, and ushered in the ability for sick funds to offer innovative insurance plans 
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organized along “managed care” lines. It mandated all citizens to take health insurance 
and safeguards access to standard benefits that include inpatient and outpatient treatment 
and care for the elderly and handicapped, with unlimited stays in nursing homes and 
hospitals. In 1999, alternative and complementary medicine benefits became part of the 
basic coverage, but they were dropped again in 2005. Within the framework of federal 
and cantonal regulation, about ninety insurers (that have to be not for profit for the 
mandatory basic coverage, but can be both for profit or not for profit when offering 
supplemental coverage) offer today a wide array of plans with varying conditions and 
costs.   
The insurance companies were originally federal, regional, religious, or 
occupationally based (Civitas 2002). Due to frequent mergers, their number has dropped 
since the mid-20th century from 1100 local insurers to about ninety in the early 2000s. 
Most are operating on a national scale. Membership varies greatly, ranging from 102 to 
1.3 million insured in 2006. They have lost their original identity as social insurer and 
now act as regular commercial insurers.  Insurers group together in the national 
association, Santesuisse, to negotiate fees with providers.   
The Swiss Constitution confers full sovereignty upon the cantons for 
administering health insurance (as it does for all other matters not specifically in the 
domain of the federal government, the Confederation). For health insurance programs, 
the Constitution sets three basic requirements: universal access to a benefit basket defined 
by the Confederation, the right of insured to change health insurer yearly and uniform 
insurance contracts. Within those legal limits, independent and competing health insurers 
negotiate contracts with providers, and offer the basic insurance coverage under a wide 
array of insurance plans. Insurers must register with the Federal Office of Public Health.  
This agency also monitors the insurance market. The cantons administer and regulate any 
insurance programs that meet the standards. 
Swiss consumers (and not employers or government) select health insurance 
plans, the size of deductibles and other conditions according to their own needs and 
preferences.  They can change insurer every year (and insurers have to accept them). The 
1994 law made insurance compulsory for all, expanded the guaranteed benefit package 
and reduced inequities by an extended (and complicated) system of cross-subsidization.  
It also allowed citizens to switch between insurers more easily than in the past. Each 
adult citizen signs an individual insurance contract.   
Government regulation plays a significant role, for example in mandating that all 
citizens take insurance, defining the basic coverage and minimum deductible, co-
payments, open enrollment and mandated contracting of all providers by all health plans.  
It is interesting to note that with the exception of the mandatory contracting, quite a few 
of those rules are similar to the current Dutch laws (see below). Health insurers have to 
offer community-rated premiums for all who live within a given area, independent of 
income, wealth or individual health risk of the insured person. Insurers receive extra 
funds to compensate for over-representation high-risk groups like elderly or chronic ill in 
their portfolio (Beck et al. 2003). Community-rating was seen as one of the core elements 
of the reform to safeguard coverage for the high-risk poor. Insurers can offer discounts to 
young adults (age 19-25) and have to offer lower premiums for children (up to age 18).  
To alleviate the impact of this regressive financing, the state gives subsidies to low-
income households. In 2004 the subsidies amounted to twenty percent of total premium 
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revenues. It is worth noting, however, that subsidies have failed to grow apace with 
premiums, and low and middle-income families now pay a higher share of their means 
than better off.   
 
Managed care and consumer choice  
 
There is no limit in choice of provider, unless insured opt for an alternative plan 
that restricts choice in exchange for lower premiums. The current health insurance is 
based on a notion of “managed competition” that shifts competition mechanisms from the 
patient-physician relation to both the health insurer-insured and health insurer-provider 
relationships (Bolgani et al. 2006). Those are similar to the family of US health 
maintenance organizations (HMO), “preferred provider organizations” (PPO), or 
“independent practice associations” (IPA) that include networks of family doctors. Those 
plans entail practices of selective contracting, gatekeeping, and financial bonus-malus 
incentives for providers to adhere to guidelines (Lehman and Zweifel, 2004). Insured can 
switch insurer or opt for another plan each year. “Managed care” plans offer premium 
discounts in exchange for a restricted freedom of choosing the doctor. A second set of 
discounted plans offers lower premiums but higher deductibles. As in other countries, 
such plans tend to attract younger, healthier, better-informed and more mobile people.   
In 1996 and 1997, the first years after the introduction of the new insurance, 
membership in managed care plans quadrupled. In the early 2000s, after a period of 
stagnation, policyholders seem to be migrating again to managed care contracts to escape 
rising premium levels. Still, in 2005, only about ten percent of insured had chosen one of 
those models. Limited financial benefits (there are legal restrictions to the maximum 
deductible insurers can offer) as well as cultural factors (in the French and Italian 
speaking cantons, only a small minority of the population has chosen for those plans) 
explain the limited growth in managed care. Some insurers offer supplementary coverage 
in addition to the obligatory basic federal plan.8 Insurers have latitude insurers in all 
matters beyond the coverage of the federal benefit basket, combined with the effects of 
federalism that leaves much regulation to the canton level. This has resulted in a wide 
variation of plans. As cantons also differ significantly in their public spending strategy, 
per capita health spending, supply of hospital and ambulatory care and consumption 
levels greatly vary across cantons. This has resulted in large differences of financial 
burdens to the insured between and within cantons, perpetuated by a lack of consumer 
mobility across plans. For example, in 2004, a family of two parents and two small 
children with an income of US$ 42,000 paid 4.7% of their disposable income in the 
canton Obwalden but sixteen percent in Neuchatel (Baltasar et al. 2005).   
Despite those differences, citizens did not exit from either their canton or health 
insurance on a large scale (Colombo 2000; Frank and Lamiraud 2007). Obviously, most 
Swiss do not want to switch and remain faithful to their fund even if premiums are 
(much) higher than elsewhere. Less than three percent of the policyholders switched 
insurer in 2006. Empirical evidence shows –similar to the experience of other countries 
where insured can choose their plan-- that people who do change mostly represent “good 
risks”: the young, healthy and higher educated (Beck et al. 2003; Strombom et al. 2002). 
The alternative is “partial exit”, a change to another policy with the same insurer. Here, 
the evidence shows that most change occurs in the high band of deductibles (more than 
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1200 francs per year). The death rate of those who had selected the minimum deductible 
is twice as high as that of the insured who had selected the average amount (Geoffard et 
al. 2006). Without doubt, a process of self-selection lies behind this pattern of preferences 
in deductible.   
The mandatory nature of the statutory package means that insurers cannot 
compete on the basis of the benefits or quality of care. They must contract with all 
hospitals and self-employed practitioners in the canton of the insured person’s residence. 
In case of an emergency, they also have to reimburse treatment in other cantons. They 
can only differentiate with the level of the basic premium and the quality of 
administrative services, or with alternative plans that restrict choice of provider in 
exchange for lower premiums. Self-employed health professionals receive fee for service 
payments, while hospital budgets are based on a mix of direct government subsidy, DRG-
based payment and other fees. 
 
Health care provision in Switzerland 
 
Swiss citizens receive their medical treatment in a wide range of settings in 
hospitals, clinics and ambulatory care facilities. Switzerland has over 400 hospitals, 
around 270 of which are public or publicly subsidized. There are 5.6 beds per 1000 
people, and hospital stays are relatively long.  Perhaps due to these factors, hospital 
expenditure is the highest in Europe. Medical specialists practice privately and in 
hospitals, though most patients are referred to hospitals for specialized procedures.  
The basic insurance covers one third of prescription drugs, subject to a ten percent 
co-payment. Patients pay for all other drugs directly, or seek supplementary coverage. 
This means that the Swiss pay heavily for pharmaceuticals and there is generally a desire 
to increase the use of generic drugs.  
The Swiss health care system is based on a liberal conception of health and 
medicine. The patient-consumer plays a central role, with freedom to choose health plan 
as well as provider. Proponents of “consumer-driven” health care (Herzlinger and Parsi 
2004) argue that this model of competing health plans promises to combine universal 
coverage with effective cost control. However, critics point to the fact that extensive 
government regulation, not competition or high out-of-pocket payments has been the 
driving force to keep costs down (Reinhardt 2004). The underlying regressivity in the 
design of premiums and the failing of fiscal subsidies to match the rates of increase in 
insurance cost (and premiums) has become a source of discontent for much of the lower 
and middle classes (Bolgiani et al. 2006). The federal government has repeatedly tried to 
reduce the inequity of premium levels across the cantons, but made little progress so far. 
 
 
Decentralized decision-making and cost control 
 
Empirical evidence shows that the Swiss model has not been very successful in 
controlling health spending. The decentralized decision-making has led to wide regional 
variety in regulatory settings, roles of public and private actors, capacity, use and 
spending levels (Crivelli et al. 2006). In fact, there is not one system but twenty-six 
cantonal subsystems, connected by the Federal health Insurance Law since 1996. This 
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decentralized system offers little room for regional cross-subsidization. In spite of the 
decentralized nature of the Swiss health insurance, the system has kept some of the 
neocorporatist elements in the bargaining over fees and tariffs. The associations of 
provider represent their members in collective bargaining at the federal and canton level, 
and insurers still have to contract with all providers.  
One of the problems in assessing the working of the Swiss system is that most 
experts limit their comparison to Switzerland and the US, often ignoring the particular 
political and social context of both countries. It is not possible to understand the Swiss 
health system without paying attention to the crucial role of direct democracy and 
federalism on the one hand, and the economic and social traditions on the other. The 
Swiss can exercise their “sovereignty” as citizen-voter, insured and patient. The system 
provides radical forms of vote in the institutions of federalism and direct democracy that 
effectively provide veto points to any system change. Insured can switch health insurer 
each year. In principle, they could also move from one canton to another, but in general 
the mobility of Swiss citizens is very low; linguistic barriers explain part of that low 
mobility. Rather than “voting by feet” (Tiebout 1956), citizens can induce change by the 
instruments of direct democracy: the referendum and popular initiative. The referendum 
is similar to a veto and has the effect of delaying or freezing the political process; the 
popular initiative can lead to constitutional amendment. Both mechanisms reduce the 
power of federal and cantonal government, and make decision-making complex and often 
slow.  
The fact that Swiss citizens can chose between exit, choice and voice has caused 
strong tensions, and resulted in weak governance of the health care system.  The 
competitive model assumes that consumers are willing and able to use their options based 
on full information about price and quality. That assumption is particularly questionable 
in a system characterized by a chronic lack of information and transparency. There is no 
systematic information available about performance indicators like clinical quality, 
efficacy and effectiveness of individual providers, prerequisites for consumer choice and 
exit. Another problem is that the proliferation of plans does not combine well with 
cantonal responsibility for the availability of health care. By law, cantons have to 
safeguard sufficient health care capacity and this has led to the creation of regional 
monopolies and fragmentation of the hospital system (Crivelli 2007).     
 
 
6. Health care reform in Taiwan  
 
Taiwan consists of one major and several smaller islands, with a total land size of 36,000 
square kilometers. It has one of the highest population densities in the world. Of the 
population of 22.8 million, the majority lives in urban areas and less than two percent live 
in the mountainous areas and offshore islands.   
Taiwan’s total national health spending was 6.2 per cent of GDP in 2005. The 
National Health Insurance (NHI) accounted for 57 per cent, out-of-pocket spending 34 
per cent, tax subsidies almost 6 per cent and other (private) sources about 4 per cent 
(DOH data). The NHI is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with the income-based 
contributions typical of social insurance. Insured, employers, and government all pay a 
share of premiums (Cheng, 2003).  In 2005, 35 per cent of the NHI revenue came from 
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employers, 38 per cent from insured, and 27 per cent from government (BNHI).  The 
contributions are levied on a per capita basis up to a maximum of three dependents per 
insured. Any additional dependents enjoy the NHI coverage for free. The government 
subsidizes 100% of the contributions for the poor and unemployed veterans.  
For over 50 years (1949-2000), Taiwan was under the one-party rule of the 
Nationalist government (Kuomintang, or KMT) that retreated to the island after defeat by 
the Chinese communists in 1949.  From the 1960s to the 1990s, Taiwan’s economy 
enjoyed high growth rates, propelling Taiwan into the ranks of the “Asian Tigers”, the 
groups of four Asian economies–Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong--that 
impressed the world by their robust and sustained economic growth and development.   
  
Health Insurance 
 
As Taiwan’s economy prospered, the government turned its attention to social policy.  By 
the late 1980s, there were 10 different health insurance schemes, each covering a 
particular subset of the population, for example the Labor Insurance (1950), Government 
Employees Insurance (1958), Farmers Insurance (1985) and Low Income Household 
Insurance (1990).  Altogether, the schemes only covered about 59 per cent of the 
population, leaving 41 per cent or 8.6 million of the then population of 21.4 million 
people uninsured. The uninsured were mostly children under 14 and adults over 65–
vulnerable populations with the greatest health care needs. Private health insurance as 
that in the U.S. did not exist (Cheng 2003). 
 The surprising wholesale move to universal coverage in 1995 built on these 
schemes, and was made possible by a window of opportunity created by the confluence 
of several factors: the abolition of the martial law in 1987 that had ruled Taiwan since 
1949 in favor of a democratic government, rising popular demand for universal coverage, 
a political challenge of Taiwan’s Nationalist government from the opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and last but not least, the strong, personal 
leadership on the issue by Taiwan’s then President Lee Teng-Hui (Cheng 2003). That 
leadership played a critically important role in establishing Taiwan’s National Health 
Insurance in 1995. 
 To prepare for the introduction of the NHI, government bureaucrats and scholars 
conducted extensive studies of health systems abroad in the 1980s. The planning took 
seven years, from 1986 to 1993. The planners drew heavily on foreign experience. The 
end product of this planning process—the NHI--was described as “a car that has been 
domestically designed and produced, but with many component parts imported from over 
ten countries” (Cheng 2003). Next, Taiwan’s Parliament deliberated over the NHI bill for 
over eighteen months and passed the bill in July 1994. On March 1, 1995 the NHI was 
implemented by presidential decree, an amazing five years ahead of schedule (Cheng, 
2003). Virtually overnight the hitherto uninsured (41% of Taiwan’s population) gained 
equal access to health care.  Within a year, their health care utilization approached the 
same level as those who had health insurance prior to 1995 (Cheng 2003). 
 The action of an impatient President to push the implementation of the NHI so far 
ahead of schedule led to a period of confusion and chaos not unlike that which 
accompanied the introduction of the Medicare program for America’s elderly in 1965 
(Cheng 2003). Critics and skeptics alike expected that the NHI would fail before it could 
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take off because of the inadequate preparation. In retrospect, however, the hasty 
implementation of the NHI may have been a blessing in disguise. In 1997, a financial 
crisis struck Asia. Even though it affected Taiwan less than Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and South Korea, Taiwan’s economic growth nevertheless slowed after 1998.  
Growth rates dropped to just over four percent in 2000 and to minus 1.7 per cent in 2001 
(compared to the high average growth rate of 10.7 per cent from 1992 to 1995, the period 
before the NHI). In such economic climate, the government might have raised more 
concerns about the affordability and sustainability of the ambitious NHI (Cheng 2003; 
DOH 2006). 
 The public warmed to the program quickly. In nationwide surveys of satisfaction, 
for most of the time after its inception, over seventy percent of the respondents declared 
themselves satisfied with the NHI, a ratio much higher than in many other countries 
(Cheng 2003). Only in 2006, after budgetary strains caused increases in out-of-pocket 
spending, public satisfaction fell to 64 per cent (BNHI satisfaction survey 2006).  
Significantly, the satisfaction rate of the residents in remote mountainous areas and 
offshore islands reached 89 per cent in 2005.Those populations were particularly happy 
with their improved access to health care through the government program of Integrated 
Delivery Service (IDS) designed specifically for those groups to improve access. 
 In brief, the NHI is a mandatory single payer health insurance. The Bureau of 
National Health Insurance (BHNI) administers the NHI under the Department of Health.  
The administrative costs of the BHNI were a mere of 1.5 per cent of NHI’s total budget 
in 2007 (Cheng 2007). This low administrative cost is largely due to the efficiency of the 
nation-wide modern and uniform administration supported by a powerful information 
system, absence of legal costs of litigation, absence of marketing and advertising 
expenses and price controls by government.9 In 2002, Taiwan’s Supreme Court ruled that 
no one in Taiwan may be denied care because of lack of ability to pay (Cheng 2003).  
Clearly, Taiwan’s society considers access to health care as a fundamental right for all.  
The NHI benefits are comprehensive. They include inpatient care, ambulatory 
care, laboratory tests, diagnostic imagining, prescription drugs and dental care (except 
orthodontics and prosthodontics), traditional Chinese medicine, day care for the mentally 
ill, limited home care, and certain preventive services (pediatric immunizations, well-
child check-ups, adult health checks including prenatal care and pap smears). Moreover, 
the NHI covers vision care, kidney dialysis, and DOH-approved orphan drugs to treat 
rare disorders (Cheng 2003). 
Health care services in Taiwan are delivered through a predominantly private 
delivery system. Patients enjoy free choice of provider and of therapy. Providers receive 
their revenues from three sources: predominantly fee-for-service payments by the BNHI, 
direct payments by patients (user fees and co-payments), and sales of goods and services 
not covered by the NHI (Cheng 2003). 
Like most if not all health systems around the globe, Taiwan’s NHI has been 
plagues by financial woes since 1998, three years after the NHI was implemented. On the 
one hand, the public enjoys free choice of providers and there is relatively high utilization 
of health services. On the other hand, policy pundits and the media have convinced the 
public that there is “waste, fraud and abuse” in the system, which government should 
eliminate before raising charges on households and employers (Cheng 2003; Cheng 
2005).  
 21
It has become fashionable in the debate on health policy –not only in the US but 
also in many other countries-- to equate the word “choice” with “choice among private 
health insurers and health insurance products”. It is doubtful, however, that this is the 
choice ordinary people have in mind when they speak of “choices in health care.” More 
likely, they have in mind unrestrained choice of provider and therapy. The most 
important lesson to be drawn from Taiwan’s experience is that a single payer system--
without choice among private insurers or wide variety in insurance products—can easily 
and relatively cheaply provide consumer choice of health care providers and therapies. 
Taiwan’s experience also illustrates the need for policy adjustments after reform. In fact, 
it confirms the general finding that health reform does not mean the once and for all 
fixing of problems. The “after reform maintenance” requires permanent monitoring and 
adjustment.  
 
 
7. Health care reform in The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands is a small, densely populated country (population of sixteen million in 
2006) located between Germany in the east, Belgium in the south, and the North Sea in 
the north and west. The country is a mid-size open European economy with a strong 
international trade position. It has a stable democracy, and a long tradition of consensual, 
“neo-corporatist” policy-making, where governments share the responsibility for social 
policy making with organized groups in society (De Swaan 1988; Lijphart 1968).    
In 2007, total health spending exceeded 50 billion euros (US$70 billion), or about 
3,100 euros (US$ 4,340; in 2006 One euro equaled about 1.4 US dollar) per person per 
year. Of this total, about 47 per cent came out of the new basic health insurance 
(introduced in 2006, see below), 42 per cent from the contributions for the long-term care 
insurance AWBZ, about 7 per cent from patient co-payments and about 5 per cent from 
tax subsidies (MoH 2006). All legal residents have to sign up with one of the forty or so 
health insurers to obtain coverage for the basic insurance, and most Dutch citizens have 
done so. They pay, on average, about 1,200 euros (US$ 1,440) per person per year as flat 
rate premiums directly to their insurer (they also pay about 1,000 euros for the AWBZ 
scheme). The government pays for the premiums of children up to 18 years old. The 
insurers receive the other half of their incomes from earmarked taxes that employers pay 
into a central fund administered by the Tax Department.     
The Netherlands health reform debate started in the early 1970s with efforts to 
centralize funding and administration, and regionalized health care planning (Okma 
1997a). In the early 1980s, the combination of the economic shock of the oil crises (with 
economic stagnation and high unemployment), the fear of aging population and the 
erosion of faith in government planning led to a change in direction of Dutch welfare 
policies. Successive governments implemented cuts in levels and duration of welfare 
support, unemployment and disability benefits and (only partly successfully) tried to 
reduce unemployment rolls and numbers of disability beneficiaries (Visser and 
Hemereijk 1997). Next, the attention shifted to health care (Okma 1997). In 1987, an 
expert committee proposed to reduce the role in government and strengthen competition 
and consumer choice (Commissie Dekker 1987). At first, the proposals met with strong 
resistance from health providers and many other stakeholders. Parliament only hesitantly 
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supported the bill (all major parties were internally divided). Government decided to 
gradually implement the plans and the first “health reform bill” passed in 1989 (MoH 
1988). After a few years, however, opposition resurfaced, political support eroded and the 
reform process effectively came to a halt (Okma 1997). The 1994 “Purple Coalition’ of 
Labor, Liberal Conservatives and Liberal Democrat parties shelved the reforms, and 
announced piecemeal improvement of the current system instead (Okma and De Roo, 
forthcoming). Interestingly, it did not reverse the reform steps of its predecessors. In the 
early 2000s, health reform made its comeback on the political agenda (De Roo 2002, 
Strategisch Akkoord 2002). The 2003 governing coalition of Liberal Conservatives and 
Christian Democrats decided to take up the basic ingredients of the earlier Dekker 
proposals, with an even stronger orientation on market competition (Hoofdlijnenakkoord 
2003). As the coalition had a comfortable majority, the reform bill passed Parliament in a 
surprisingly short and uncontested way in 2005. The return of the Labor Party PvdA in 
2007 to the coalition government did not affect the introduction of the insurance 
(Regeerakkoord 2007). The main players in the field, in particular health insurers and 
some large providers, had already anticipated on the introduction of the new scheme, and 
expressed far less opposition than during earlier reform debates.   
In January 2006, a new “basic health insurance” (or rather, mandate to take out 
private insurance, somewhat similar to the Swiss health insurance mandate) replaced the 
former mix of public and private health insurance (Bartolomee and Maarse 2007)10. The 
funding of the new scheme consists of a mix of direct contributions, earmarked taxes and 
government subsidy. The scheme combines elements of both the former private and 
former social insurance11. All residents can choose their insurance for the basic coverage 
and can take out supplemental coverage. The term “basic” is actually somewhat 
misleading as the entitlements include a wide range of preventive services, inpatient and 
ambulatory medical care, prescription drugs and medical aids. That coverage more or less 
equals that of the former sick fund scheme. Efforts in the last ten years to scale down this 
range of entitlements by de-listing items from the social health insurance in the past have 
not been very successful; in fact, they read as a “catalogue of failure” (Maarse and Okma 
2005).   
Health insurers receive about fifty percent of their revenue from flat rate 
premiums directly from their insured, and about fifty percent from a central fund that 
channels the earmarked contributions withheld by employers via the tax system. Low-
income families can apply for fiscal subsidy.12 Patients face modest amounts of co-
payment for inpatient and outpatient care. By law, premiums for the basic coverage are 
community-based, but insurers set their own premiums. Insurers cannot turn down 
applicants. They attract new customers (or try to retain their clients) by offering low flat-
rate premiums and good services; providers are competing for contracts with the insurers 
by offering low rates and good services. In that way, at least on paper, all Dutch citizens 
will get good quality and not too expensive health care.   
In 2006, about one fifth of the population changed their insurer and coverage at 
the introduction of the new scheme, mostly via collective contracts. That number was 
higher than expected, and prompted some to declare victory of the competition model 
(Laske-Aldershof et al 2004). In the second year of the new insurance, however, less than 
five percent of Dutch insured changed fund, over eighty percent of those as part of a 
collective employment-based contract (Smit and Mookveld 2007). Thus in fact, only 
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about one percent of the change of health plan was “consumer-driven”. In a way, the new 
scheme has strengthened the employment-base of the health insurance even while its 
basic underlying notion is that of individual choice. A new phenomenon in the Dutch 
insurance market is the rise of collective contracting by certain groups of patients (at least 
for groups that insurers are willing to accept).  
In 2007, the number of uninsured was rising as families had difficulty in paying 
the monthly flat rate premiums (that before were withheld by employers as part of 
earmarked taxation or by welfare offices). Even while compared to the US, the number of 
uninsured is still very low, less than 3 per cent of the population, it poses a political 
problem for the government. First, government proposed that if uninsured would end up 
in hospital, they would face the costs of hospitalization themselves and would not only 
have to take insurance at the spot but pay a fine as well. Then, as a study showed that that 
(young) immigrants, single parents and welfare recipients were over-represented in the 
delinquent population, it realized that model would be hard to enforce (CBS 2007). The 
government next proposed to abolish the direct payment of flat rate premiums for welfare 
recipients altogether and have the local welfare offices administer those charges (a 
solution already proposed by the welfare offices of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 2005). 
The MoH also took over the costs of debt collection from the insurers as long as they 
would keep the delinquents on their roll (MoH 2007). 
Thus far, the new competition has not been successful in driving down premiums 
or health expenditure (Kreis 2005). In 2007, average premiums went up by about ten per 
cent and most experts expect a further hike as several health insurers has spend excessive 
amounts on marketing and advertising to keep or extend their market share (Smit and 
Mookveld 2007). As the new competitive model went into effect in January 2006, it is 
too early to assess to what extent that competition has improved the quality and 
efficiency or patient-friendliness of the system.   
Dutch hospitals and other health facilities have a centuries-long tradition of 
private, not for profit ownership and governance by self-appointed boards (De Swaan 
1988; Okma 1997a). The last two decades have seen the rise of new specialty, investor-
owned for profit clinics (mostly for elective surgery on an outpatient base). Still, that has 
hardly affected the dominant not for profit pattern. And many hospital managers do not 
feel at ease with the new demands of market competition (Rosenberg 2006; Rosenberg 
2007). There has been a rapid process of mergers and takeovers that led to smaller 
numbers of bigger hospitals as well as vertical and horizontal integration of health 
services (Boot 1998; RVZ 2003). This market concentration has raised concerns of the 
national competition authority (NMa). In some cases, NMa denied approval of mergers 
when those might lead to regional monopolies or exclude competition altogether.  
One of the side effects of the increased emphasis on competition has been the 
erosion of the traditional corporatist bargaining model in The Netherlands (Okma 2002). 
For many decades, associations of hospitals, medical professionals and other providers 
met with representatives of the public and private health insurers to negotiate contracts 
and discuss policy developments. As the NMa has ruled that such collective bargaining, 
in fact, implied undue market protection and exclusion of newcomers, they had to 
abandon this practice. Hospitals, general practitioners, dentists and others have now to 
seek contracts with the health insurers on an individual basis. This has greatly added to 
the administrative complexity (and costs) of the system.  
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The majority of general practitioners and dentists work in solo or small group 
practices. Other health professionals, for example physical therapists, dieticians or speech 
therapists, work in hospitals or nursing homes, and a minority as self-employed 
practitioners. Within the overall framework of government regulation, insurers negotiate 
with hospitals, self-employed health practitioners and other health care providers.13 The 
incomes of family physicians consist of a mix of payments. They receive a fixed amount 
(”capitated payment”) for each patient, fees for certain activities and special subsidies 
(e.g. for buying computers). The largest share of hospital budgets is (still) based on 
historical costs, but the system is slowly shifting to case-based payments. At first, 
government encouraged medical specialists and hospitals to develop case-based tariffs 
themselves, but this decentralized process led to over 40,000 tariffs (only covering about 
ten percent of all hospital activity) and turned out too complicated to administer. The 
implementation of the “home-grown” and very complicated DRG-based hospital 
payment model has slowed down, and in 2007, government announced a drastic 
simplification.  
While the policy rhetoric in The Netherlands emphasizes market efficiency, less 
government and more consumer choice14, the state has not reduced its presence. In fact, it 
has extended its role in different ways. Under responsibility of the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) and the Ministry of Finance, a new health competition authority Zorgauthoriteit, 
monitors the functioning of insurance and health care markets. The MoH itself has 
become active in sponsoring the development of new payment models and other cost 
control mechanisms.  
In 2002, it announced that the responsibility for long-term care AWBZ would 
shift to local authorities (and not, as in former reform plans that failed, to the health 
insurers). That would also have meant the imposition of stricter means testing to restrain 
access to those services. However, in 2007, government announced a moratorium on 
changes in the long-term care insurance AWBZ. Thus far, there has been not much 
debate on the question whether the area of long-term care should be open to more 
competition and consumer choice (Okma 1997b). In the past, certain patient groups in 
this field (in particular groups of psychiatric patients and relatives of mentally retarded 
persons) have been effective in pushing for improvement. Also, the AWBZ scheme offers 
vouchers or cash benefits to chronic ill patients who then can contract services of their 
own choice. Within a few years, this cash benefit scheme became very popular and in 
2005, over 50,000 patients received on average over 20,000 euros per year. The total 
budget for those vouchers now exceeds 1 billion euro, while to total budget for home care 
serving over 600,000 patients per year, is about 2 billion euro. Clearly, those 
developments in ling term care are examples of direct consumer voice and consumer exit 
(Hirschman 1970). It is less clear whether patients are keen to develop such role in the 
area of acute medical care (Okma and ooijens 2005).    
Is important to note that the 2006 health insurance reforms have not (fully) 
replaced earlier models of government planning and control. Reflecting strong support 
for solidarity in social policy, Dutch governments have regularly taken steps to mitigate 
the financial effects of privatization, for example by exempting certain services or 
population groups from user fees. Some experts argue that the different modes of 
governance complement each other (Helderman 2007). In fact, the current Dutch health 
care system shows an intricate layering and overlap of competing and sometimes 
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conflicting governance models. Traditional models of social insurance, notions of 
regionalized governance, and new elements of market competition combine with 
increased central government control. The current health governance in The Netherlands 
reflects efforts to decentralize into a territorial direction (from central government to 
regional and local authorities) and to decentralize in a ‘functional’ sense (from state to 
markets and individuals). At the same time, faced with budget pressures (or perceived 
budget pressures, or perceived potential future budget pressures), central government has 
not given up its role (Scheerder 2005, MoH 2004), nor has it reduced the size of central 
administration. It has actually expanded its role in monitoring and supervision of health 
care and health insurance. The system is less market-oriented than some experts claim 
(Schut and Van de Ven 2005; Enthoven and Van de Ven 2007), or some foreign 
observers who see the Dutch model as an example for the US seem to hope (Nauk 2007; 
Harris 2007).   
The Dutch experience also confirms the need for post-reform maintenance. For 
example, in 2007, the government abandoned the no-claim restitution (only implemented 
one year before) and replaced that with a modest mandatory deductible for the basic 
insurance after critics claimed the no-claim bonus was unfair to insured with higher 
levels of health expenditure. In several cases, government reinstated entitlements it had 
de-listed only a few years (e.g. dental care) before because of widespread opposition 
(Maarse and Okma 2005). Likewise, the rise of numbers of uninsured in 2007 prompted 
government to take action.   
 
 
7. Conclusions: Debates, Reforms and Policy Adjustments  
 
This section summarizes our findings on the origins and the fate of the health reform 
debates in Chile, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan and The Netherlands. Why (and 
when) did those countries embark on the health reform trail in the 1980s and 1990s?  
What were the major policy goals and reform options discussed? Was there explicit 
reference to other countries' reform experience? Who were the main stakeholders and 
what were their positions? What option became reality? And finally, what were the 
(intended and unintended, the expected and unexpected) outcomes, and what happened 
during implementation?  
In the 1980s and 1990s, all six countries undertook systematic reviews of their 
health care. Both endogenous and exogenous factors added to the pressure to change. The 
oil crises of the mid-1970s, the end of the post-war baby boom and changing ideological 
views of the role of state and citizens combined to trigger extensive debate about the 
future of the welfare state. Thus budgetary and fiscal restraints, changing ideology and 
changing economic conditions played a role in reshaping social policy. The Asian 
countries faced a unique situation created by long periods of high economic growth. The 
new prosperity increased the expectations of the populations that government would not 
only initiate income-protection schemes for old age and illness, but also provide the fiscal 
means for making sure the entire populations could benefit. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
periods of phenomenal economic growth, two of the “Asian tigers” Singapore and 
Taiwan saw the need for a systematic buildup of the income protection schemes that had 
started in Western Europe after the industrial revolution. They both realized universal 
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coverage for health insurance. In both countries, expansion, rather than contraction of the 
welfare state was the main point, though in strikingly different ways.   
The goals of the reforms in all six countries were similar: improved access to 
health services (through expanding public or private health insurance), improved quality 
and efficiency of services (through a mix or market-oriented and regulatory measures) 
and greater consumer and patient choice (freedom to switch to another insurer, or to a 
different plan with different financial conditions, but also, freedom of choice of 
provider).15 All countries except Chile realized universal or near-universal health 
insurance coverage, but their success with other goals, in particular consumer choice, has 
been more modest. Insured now have a larger choice of health plans in Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Israel. In Chile, they can opt out from the public scheme to take out 
private coverage. At the same time, there is decreased choice of providers because of 
selective contracting in Chile, Switzerland and The Netherlands. In those countries, 
insurers gained decision-making power of the contracting with providers. In Chile and 
Singapore, governments strengthened their role in contracting services by imposing new 
rules and in Taiwan government itself became the sole health insurer. The expansion of 
private insurance led to increased risk selection in Chile, Switzerland and The 
Netherlands. Shifts toward decentralized private governance also increased the 
administrative complexity and overhead costs in those countries. The goal of cost 
containment, it seems, has been most successful in the most centralized systems; low 
overhead costs because of uniform administration and the imposition of country-wide 
fees and tariffs played an important role (e.g. in Taiwan). The complexity of the Swiss 
model reflects in its rising costs. Within a few years, Switzerland reached the world top 
of health expenditure after the US.  
At the two extremes of the range of options considered are full privatization of 
health insurance and provision (considered by Chile, Singapore, Switzerland and The 
Netherlands) and nationalization (considered by Chile). In the end, no country has fully 
privatized or fully nationalized its entire health care system. After considering 
alternatives, Israel extended its Bismarckian model of employment-based insurance to 
cover the entire population, but left the responsibility for administering the scheme in the 
hands of the existing of sick funds. It also introduced choice of fund for the insured.  
Singapore, despite 140 years of British rule and influence, never went Beveridgean but 
instead emphasized individual over state responsibility and encouraged private sector 
participation. Taiwan nationalized its health insurance but the provision of health care 
services remained predominantly private. During the military regime of 1974-1991, Chile 
shifted towards private health insurance. After the restoration of democracy, it 
strengthened the public sector and sought to impose strict rules on the private sector to 
counteract the problems of risk-selection. Over four decades, The Netherlands reform 
debate shifted from considering a fully nationalized health insurance with state controlled 
health care provision (based on regional planning) towards market-oriented options. In 
2006, it implemented a new insurance model that, like the Swiss one, combines public 
and private elements. Switzerland took the lead in experimenting with a new health 
insurance model that combines public rules with private insurance administration 
(somewhat similar to the Dutch scheme of 2006). The model offers basic coverage to all, 
with the possibility to opt out to alternative schemes with different financial conditions. It 
kept the existing mix of public, and both not for profit and for profit providers.  
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Not only the direction, but also the speed of implementation of reforms varied 
widely.  In the mid-1990s, after carefully considering alternatives, Taiwan opted for a 
nation-wide public health insurance scheme, by far the simplest model for universal 
coverage and uniform administration (and thus, as experience has shown, with low 
administrative costs). It implemented the model in a very short time span. With similar 
speed, Singapore put a complicated mix of private (but mandatory) savings schemes and 
public safety net funding in place. It successfully implemented an ingenious financing 
mechanism that, combined with public subsidies for primary care and hospitals, assures 
that everyone has reasonable access to basic medical services. Singapore first wanted to 
privatize all of its hospitals, but, faced with public dissatisfaction, the government 
reversed its course within a few months. It retained the hospitals and other health 
facilities under government control and integrated hospital and outpatient services under 
broader governance structures. Quality of care improved, but it came at higher costs. 
Singapore is an example of a country where a strong central governments can design and 
implement (and rapidly adjust) major policy change without much opposition from 
organized interests. Taiwan has seen a rise in political opposition and citizen 
empowerment in recent years. Governments of countries with “older” models in place, 
like Chile, Israel or The Netherlands, have had a much harder time change the system in 
the face of opposing stakeholders. In fact, both Israel and The Netherlands (and to a 
lesser degree, Switzerland as well) have neo-corporatist policy traditions, the model that 
assumes that government shares the responsibility for social policy with other organized 
stakeholders in society. That tradition also provides ample veto power to stakeholders 
who feel that proposed change will negatively affect their positions.  In none of the 
countries of this study, organized citizens or patients played a dominant role in the reform 
process even while governments often quoted expanding consumer and patient choice as 
one of the main reasons for change. In several cases, broad popular support for existing 
social policy severely restrained governments’ possibilities to shift costs top patients, or 
forced policy-makers to adjust their course.  
All countries have shifted, or are in the process of shifting, payment for hospital 
care from overall global budgets or per diem payments to some form of diagnoses-related 
groups (DRG) or case-based payment. The DRG model rarely covers all expenses as 
hospitals often receive separate funding for their capital investments and certain very 
expensive treatments. In all countries, self-employed health professionals receive fees for 
their services, often combined with additional payment for specific activities. Thus 
instead of a shift from one payment model to another, all countries have shifted to mixed 
methods. 
Some countries studied the experience abroad before deciding on their reform 
course. Chile looked at the US for inspiration of its earlier reforms. Both Singapore and 
Taiwan did explicitly “shop around” for health reform models and considered the 
experience abroad as possible options before finally implementing two entirely different 
models. In The Netherlands, the 1987 “Dekker Committee” report has no references to 
other countries’ experience. The 2006 insurance of Holland resembles the Swiss model 
(but without the restraints of devolved administration). In fact, in the early 2000s Dutch 
policy-makers and politicians had visited Switzerland and were clearly impressed with 
what they saw (or wanted to see).  
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One common experience is that the labels used in the international reform debate 
do not always reflect reality. For example, Singapore is often quoted as the country that 
successfully introduced individual savings accounts to pay for medical care. In fact, those 
accounts only count for a modest share of total health care funding as government 
subsidy and employers’ mandatory contributions are more important. Moreover, there are 
several forms of cross-subsidies to safeguard access to health care for lower income 
groups. The Dutch health insurance of 2006 initially was labeled as “private” but for 
different reasons, it ended as “public”.  
What are the lessons we can draw from that experience?  
First, major change is rare. The cases of this study contain clear examples of 
“windows of opportunity” for change (Kingdon 1984). For example, the confluence of 
political willingness to change, popular perceptions of the need to reform and the 
availability of reform options that fit the national context, created a fertile ground for 
success in Taiwan and Singapore to implement major reforms. Israel shares some of the 
neo-corporatist features of the social policy arena with Germany, Switzerland and The 
Netherlands. This model traditionally provided organized interests veto power to thwart 
or slow down change proposed by government. In The Netherlands, the erosion of some 
of the institutions that traditionally dominated social policy-making (and offered ample 
opportunity for organized stakeholders to block change) combined with a strong position 
of the new governing coalition dominated by the Christian Democratic Party allowed for 
a surprisingly rapid passage of reform law in 2006.   
Second, values matter. Over time, dominant cultural orientations or values in 
society have shaped political and other institutions that serve to channel interests, but 
reversely, such institutions themselves shape values as well (Marmor, Okma and Latham 
2006). For example, the Canada Health Act of 1984 (CHA) expresses general support for 
universal access to health care for all Canadians. Over time, CHA itself has become a 
symbol of national unity, itself adding to the sense of common values in Canada. In many 
countries, there is strong popular support for old age pension schemes and health care 
(perhaps even more than for unemployment and disability benefits). Everywhere, strong 
popular support for government-sponsored (not necessarily government provided) 
arrangements that safeguard universal access to health care has limited options for 
governments to shift too much of the financial burden to families.16 In a way, Singapore 
is an exception: an entitlement culture has not taken root. Government has successfully 
coaxed the highly disciplined, rags-to riches immigrant population to assume greater 
responsibility for its own health care. Mitigated by government subsidies, health care 
financing has shifted to private pockets without much fuss. Singapore’s Medisave scheme 
appealed to traditional Asian values by identifying the family rather than the state, as the 
basic unit of solidarity and risk pooling.  
Third, institutions matter. In a narrow sense, political institutions as defined as the 
political decision-making structure are crucial for enabling not only reform, but also the 
speed of change, for example in Singapore and Taiwan. In contrast, the particular 
institutional configuration of the Swiss federalist tradition has limited the range of 
options available for policy-makers. In a wider sense, including more organizations in 
society (and generally accepted practices), institutions have been important in explaining 
slow policy change in Israel and The Netherlands, with powerful stakeholders thwarting 
or slowing down reform efforts. Certain policies, once in place, can create their own 
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constituencies (Pierson, 1994). For example, old age pension schemes and social health 
insurance have become popular in many countries. The experience in The Netherlands 
shows that beneficiaries (in the case of health care, patients and their families and 
providers) will resist shifts in financial burden by increasing patient cost-sharing or 
delisting entitlements.  
Fourth, reforming health care systems is not a one-shot effort. Most countries 
have adjusted their reform pathways when outcomes did not meet expectations. In all 
cases, there was a need for “after reform maintenance”. Facing unexpected and unwanted 
side effects, public dissatisfaction and strong opposition by organized stakeholders, 
governments had to adjust policy, and in some cases, reversed their policy course or 
abandoned policies altogether. In fact, “after reform maintenance” seems to be a more or 
less permanent feature everywhere. Both endogenous and exogenous factors contribute to 
this process of permanent change. The main actors in the health system anticipate 
strategically and adjust to new realities. Innovation in medical technology has improved 
the quality of care and expanded treatment options, but it also has driven up costs. New 
managerial ideas and information technology affect the organization and governance of 
hospitals and health facilities. Unexpected and undesired outcomes may force 
governments to adjust their course of reverse earlier steps. External fiscal strains and 
budget pressures restrain the availability of public funding. 
Sixth, country categorizations do not fit easily. It is hard if not impossible to 
design or apply any meaningful categorization of countries or entire health care systems. 
Countries face similar challenges and options, but differ greatly in the direction and speed 
of implementing social policy change because of country-specific contextual factors. This 
study shows common problems and policy options, common system elements and a 
common range of policy instruments and measures considered, but there is no clear 
pattern of the constellation of those system elements before or after the health reforms. It 
thus may be more important to focus on system elements than on entire countries or 
“health care systems”. It is easier to categorize (or characterize) programs and policies 
than an entire country’s health arrangements. Moreover, the level of programs and policy 
measures offers a realistic laboratory of policy change rather than (announced) health 
system reform at the national level. For example, the slow implementation of the DRG-
based payment of hospitals in Israel and The Netherlands contrasts with the rapid speed 
of introducing similar change in Singapore (where DRG payments took only one year to 
roll out). Israel’s successful experience with defining the entitlements of the social health 
insurance (or “explicit rationing”) stands out as a policy experience not shared by other 
countries.   
And finally, despite the rhetoric of retrenchment, consumer choice and market 
competition, there has been more rather than less government action almost everywhere. 
Nowhere did governments give up their regulatory authority over health care, even in 
cases where they strongly supported markets and consumer choice as instruments to 
allocate resources. Some countries developed new instruments for monitoring markets 
and informing consumers, but kept the old ones for controlling public (and sometimes 
private) expenditure, for example by delisting of entitlements from social insurance, 
imposing budgets, user fees and changes in the mix of payment methods.   
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Tables  
Table 1 below shows that surface-wise, Chile is the largest country of the group and 
Singapore the smallest. Taiwan has the biggest population, Singapore the smallest.  
Population density is by far the highest in Singapore, followed by The Netherlands and 
Israel. Switzerland has the highest average income (and the highest mountains), with The 
Netherlands and Singapore second and third. In the early 2000s, Chile and Taiwan had 
the highest economic growth rates while the economies of The Netherlands and 
Switzerland were lagging behind. The large differences between the national income per 
person measured in current US dollars and in “purchasing power parity” illustrates that it 
is not easy to compare patterns of health spending across nations without taking real 
family incomes into account. The PPP amounts show much smaller income differences 
between the countries than the plain dollar amounts. Similarly, the amounts of health 
spending per person usually shown in international statistics can underestimate (or 
overestimate) what those amounts can buy for a family.   
 
Table 1: Size, Population, Income and Economic Growth in Chile, Israel, Singapore, 
Switzerland, Taiwan and The Netherlands, early 2000s 
Statistic Chile Israel Singapore Switzerland Taiwan Netherlands 
Size (1000 square km) 757 22 0.7 41 36 42 
Population, 2005 (millions) 16.1 6.8 4.2 7.4 22.9 16.3 
Population density, 2005  
(people/sq. km)  
21.8 319.9 6301.6 185.9 63.6 483.2 
Share of population in urban 
area, 2005 (%) 
87.6 91.6 100 75.2  63.2 80.2 
Economic growth 1990-99 
(%) 
6.6 5.3 7.7 1 8.7 2.9 
Economic growth 2000-04 
(%) 
3.7 0.8 2.9 0.6 3.5 0.5 
GDP per capita, 2005 (US$) 6,040 18,580 26,620 55,320 15,036* 39,340 
GDP per capita, 2005 (PPP) 10,610 23,770 27,370 35,660 28,552 29,500 
* 2004 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, Washington: The World Bank, 2006. Central 
Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook 2005. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html.  Department of Health, Republic of China, 2005 Taiwan Public Health Report, 
Department of Health, R.O.C. (Taiwan), 2006.  Department of Health, Republic of China, 2005, Health 
Care Statistical Trends, Department of Health, R.O.C. (Taiwan), 2006. 
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Table 2 shows large variations in health care spending, inputs (as an example, the 
numbers of health professionals and hospital beds) and health outcomes (life expectancy 
and child mortality) across the six countries of this study. Switzerland has the highest 
GDP share of health expenditure as well as the highest amount per capita, followed by 
The Netherlands. The lowest is Singapore, followed by Chile and Taiwan. Thus 
Singapore is the “exception” of the close statistical relation that seems to exist in the 
OECD world between income level and health spending. There is not that much variation 
in life expectancy; clearly, as many other studies have shown, health spending does not 
explain variations in health outcomes. The data also illustrates that life expectancy or 
child mortality–commonly taken as measures of the quality of health care—are not 
closely related to spending levels or numbers of health professionals. All countries saw 
the average life expectancy of the population go up and child mortality go down in the 
1990s.  The share of public spending in total health expenditure ranges between thirty-for 
(Singapore) and seventy (Israel). But the terms “public” and “private” are sometimes 
misleading as government regulation severely restricts private actors in several countries.   
 
Table 2:  Health Expenditure, Health Care Professionals and Health Profile of 
Chile, Israel, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan and The Netherlands, 1980-2004  
Statistic Year Chile Israel Singapore Switzer-
land 
Taiwan Netherlands 
Total health 
expenditure  
(% GDP) 
2000 
2004 
6.3 
6.1 
8.5 
8.7 
3.6 
3.7 
10.4 
11.5 
5.7 
6.2 
8.0 
9.2 
Health expenditure per 
capita (current US$) 
2000 
2004 
307 
359 
1,605 
1,534   
820 
943 
3,562 
5,572 
794 
908 
1,925 
3,442 
Public expenditure as 
share of total (%)* 
2000 
2004 
47.9 
47.0 
71.8 
70.0 
35.4 
34.0 
55.6 
58.5 
60.6 
64.2 
63.1 
62.4 
Physicians per 1,000 
people** 
2000-
2003 
1.1 3.8 1.4 3.6 1.4 3.1 
Physicians, nurses and 
midwives per 1,000 
people** 
2000-
2003 
1.7 10.3 5.6 12.1 5.8 16.7 
Life expectancy at 
birth (years) 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2005 
69.3 
73.7 
76.9 
78.2 
73.9 
76.6 
79.0 
79.7 
71.5 
74.3 
78.1 
79.7 
75.5 
77.2 
79.7 
81.2 
n.a. 
74.5  
75.6 
77.6 
76.7 
76.9 
78.0 
79.3 
Infant mortality rate 
(per 1000 births) 
1980 
1990 
2000 
2005 
35.0 
18.0 
10.0 
8.0 
16.1 
9.9 
5.8 
5.0 
11.7 
6.7 
2.9 
3.0 
9.1 
6.8 
4.9 
4.0 
n.a. 
8.0 
5.7 
5.0 
8.7 
7.2 
4.6 
4.0 
 
*Although financed by means of (income independent) community-rated premiums for private health 
insurance, in international comparisons mandatory health insurance expenditure is usually included for 
Switzerland and The Netherlands in the share of public expenditure. 
** most recent year available 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; OECD Health Data 2005; Taiwan Department 
of Health, Office of Statistics, National Health Expenditures 2004, Taiwan, R.O.C.: Department of Health, 
2006;  Department of Health of Republic of China, 2005 Taiwan Public Health Report, Department of 
Health, R.O.C.(Taiwan) 2006; Department of Health of Republic of China, Health Care Statistical Trends, 
Department of Health, R.O.C. (Taiwan), 2006; Cheng, 2003.   
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1 This contribution is the result of an international collaborative effort.  The authors share the introduction 
and general conclusions, but the country experts wrote the country pictures. Thus Kieke Okma and Hans 
Maarse wrote the section on Dutch health reform, Tsung-Mei Cheng on Taiwan, David Chinitz on Israel, 
Luca Crivelli on Switzerland, Meng-Kin Lim on Singapore and Maria Eliana Labra on Chile.   
2 One important methodological issue is the need to carefully define terms and concepts. That seems to be a 
superfluous and self-evident remark, but many policy debates (and studies) are clouded by fuzzy terms.  
For example, in the last decades the term “health care reform” has appeared in numerous articles, journals, 
papers, books, conferences and academic meetings.  However, few if any clearly define the term “reform” 
(Marmor and Okma 2003).  Many comparative studies aim to analyze processes of health reform across the 
globe, but few pay attention to what it is, conceptually, they seek to explain.   
3  “Governance”’, another example of a conceptually fuzzy term, is a rising star in the terminology of 
today.  Basically, the term refers to the administration of health insurance and health care.  Interestingly, it 
has traveled from government to the corporate sector and back again to the public sector (Okma 2002, see 
footnote 14 and 18).  During this migration, it also shed its neutral meaning and took on a normative 
connotation under the label of “good governance”.  In this contribution, we take “governance” in a neutral 
sense: administration (both public and private) of health services and health insurance. We characterize 
governance styles by looking at the ‘dominant cultural orientation’ and dominant welfare orientations that 
affect the style of social policy making in each country.  
4 One question we have not addressed extensively in this paper is what counts as “small” or “medium” 
country.  Most international comparative studies take one or more of the world’s large countries as the 
main comparator: the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, France and sometimes other large OECD member 
states.  We use the term “small and medium sized” to indicate countries that clearly do not belong that 
group.  In the introduction of his grand oeuvre Rich Democracies, Harold Wilensky addresses the issue of 
the size of countries. He argues that rather than actual size in terms of population or geography, it is the 
complexity of administration that matters (Wilensky, 2002).  
5 Qualitative research by Chinitz indicates that Israeli physicians spend up to 10% of their time engaged in 
quarrels with sick fund managers over these points. The physicians often win the argument, but the 
organizational consequences in terms of efficiency and morale are significant. 
6 For an updated general presentation of the Swiss health care system see OECD 2006.   
7 It is important to note that until the Revised Health Insurance Law of 1996, health insurance was optional 
at the federal level.  Before 1994, four cantons had made affiliation to a health plan mandatory for the 
entire population, and eight cantons for special population groups like low-income families or foreigners.  
8 As they are private (and governed by private law), the supplemental insurances face less government 
control than the basic coverage. Insurers can impose more restrictions.  In practice, however, most people 
do not clearly distinguish the two and the supplemental coverage may influence the choice of basic plan.  
9 Those low overhead costs compare to other programs run by government, for example the Medicare or 
Veterans’ health Services in the US.  Those expenses are generally much higher for private health 
administration –some studies even suggest that those overheads cause twenty-four percent of total health 
spending in the US (Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 2003). 
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10 Until 2006, eligibility to social health insurance was limited to about 60 percent of Dutch population; 
almost all of the remaining 40 percent of population insured with either work-related group insurance or 
individual health insurance. 
11 There is some dispute over the question whether it should be labeled public or private --that question has 
not yet been tested by the European Court of Justice, the only authority that can decide on that matter. 
12 Interestingly, for this purpose, over 40% of the Dutch population qualifies as ‘low income’. In 2005, the 
Tax Department hired over 600 extra staff to administer the subsidies including a monthly income check of 
all applicants. In 2007, the Health Ministry announced plans to simplify that administration.  
13 Since national competition law based on European law prohibits market collusion, Dutch health care 
providers have had to abandon their long tradition of collective bargaining between national associations of 
insurers and providers over fees and tariffs (in Germany, that traditional neo-corporatist model is still in 
place).  Nowadays, hospitals, general practitioners and other independent providers have to sit down and 
negotiate individually with all the health insurance they seek contracts with; and health insurers no longer 
have to contract with every provider. 
14 Actually, it is more correct to say that the reforms increased choice of health insurer and decreased 
choice of provider; selective contracting means that not all providers will get contracts, and some patients 
thus face a restricted choice.   
15 Paradoxically, the introduction of market competition has in some cases actually reduced patients choice 
of provider.  For example, after the abolishment of mandatory contracting in the Dutch sick fund system in 
1991, the funds no longer had to contract all independent health professionals.  Thus, while the Dutch 
citizens have more choice of health insurer, their choice of provider may be curtailed because of selective 
contracting by their health insurer.   
16 As we have observed elsewhere, values can direct policy-making into a certain direction, or exclude 
certain options, but they do not tell policy-makers exactly what to do (Marmor, Okma and Latham, 2005). 
